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Abstract 
What actions do governments around the world take that may affect individuals’ 
trust in the government that positively influence tax morale (or a positive attitude 
toward tax compliance)? This paper researches which are the most salient 
government institutions that breed individual trust and the extent to which this trust 
ends up increasing citizens’ tax morale. We use cross-country survey information 
from the World Values Survey and the Freedom House spanning 92 countries and 
six survey waves during the period 1981-2014. Conditional on the level of political 
rights and civil liberties, we confirm prior evidence that trust in government 
organizations positively influences tax morale. More importantly, our findings 
show that it is trust in output government organizations that implement and deliver 
public goods and services to the citizenry that has a significantly larger impact on 
tax morale as compared to citizens’ trust in input-side organizations, such as the 
legislative and the executive branches of the government that design policy. We 
also exploit periods of democratic transitions, when large variations in trust may be 
present, to assess the role of trust in government organizations for tax morale using 
a treatment effects model. Our results reveal a robust, positive impact of negative 
democratic transitions on tax morale. 
Keywords: Tax morale, tax compliance, trust in government, government 
institutions, democratic transition, World Values Survey 
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Does trust in government organizations influence individuals’ tax morale?1 If so, is it trust 
in political institutions (input side) or administrative government organizations (output side) that 
matters the most? And does variation in political rights and civil liberties due to democratic 
transitions affect these relationships? These are important questions as it is not entirely clear what 
is that government does to successfully elicit taxpayers’ trust. In this paper we draw from the recent 
literature on social capital and institutional trust which highlights that treating trust in different 
government institutions similarly, as in a general “trust in government,” glosses over the different 
ways by which citizens come to trust distinct government institutions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).2 
We distinguish between organizations on the output side of government such as those charged 
with delivering civil services or policing as well as the courts and the input side of government, 
which includes the political organizations of government such as the legislative and the executive 
branches of the government that design policy. 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (“AS”) provided the theoretical underpinnings for an 
answer to why individuals pay their taxes based on deterrence motives (Becker, 1968). However, 
lab and field experiments indicate that the average level of taxpayer compliance would appear to 
exceed what the AS model would predict based on the actual probabilities of audit and effective 
penalties (Alm et al., 2010). In addition, the model’s exclusive reliance on pecuniary incentives 
overlooks voluntary tax compliance (Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007).3  
 
1 Tax morale has been defined as voluntary compliance with tax laws, an “umbrella term capturing nonpecuniary 
motivations for tax compliance” such as intrinsic motivations, social or cultural norms, and departures from the 
behaviors predicted by the expected utility framework (Torgler, 2006; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). 
2 As is customary in the tax morale literature, we measure “trust in government” using World Values Survey 
responses to “how much confidence” in different government branches do individual have (Daude et al., 2013). 
3 Voluntary compliance may be also affected by the authorities’ behavior. For example, taxpayers may read 
authorities’ increased reliance on penalties and audits as a sign that they are not trusted, and thus choose to 




The limitations of the AS model have prompted the search for extensions that may better 
capture the complexity of tax compliant behavior (Alm, 1999; Alm and Torgler, 2011; Slemrod, 
2007). From a theoretical angle, some research has focused on the role of norms, social customs 
and group conformity to account for the potential moral costs incurred by taxpayers arising from 
any deviation from the underlying norm (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Schnellenbach, 2006). In the 
same spirit, Traxler (2010) incorporates tax morale into the AS model as a social norm towards 
tax compliance. This gives rise to a societal interdependence as the optimal taxpayer behavior is 
conditional on another taxpayers’ compliance.  Taxpayers may comply with their taxes because 
they feel tax compliance is a duty, which in turn increases the moral costs of engaging in tax 
cheating (Cyan et al., 2016; Scholz and Pinney, 1995). In turn, the duty to comply with one’s tax 
payments may increase when taxes decrease (Scholz and Lubell, 1998a), or when taxpayers trust 
government and other taxpayers to hold onto their side of the tax contract (Scholz and Lubell, 
1998b). This fits with the more general perspective of the role of norms in society as guiding 
individual behavior and reducing uncertainty in exchange (North, 1994). Thus, norms would seem 
to act as devices helping individuals to make their own tax compliance decisions (Torgler, 2003b). 
As a consequence, instead of a single model of taxpayer behavior, we can expect a diversity of 
behaviors (Torgler, 2003b; Alm, 1999). With regards to the sensitivity to social norms, some 
individuals may be affected by what others around them think (or do) regarding compliance with 
taxes (Frey and Torgler, 2007), and comply or evade on the basis of  what others say or do (Litina 
and Palivos, 2016).4 In this regard, using a randomized survey experiment, Doerrenberg and Peichl 
(2018) find that a statement about tax evasion rates in society can actually backfire by effectively 
 
4 Because tax compliance can be interpreted to be quasi-voluntary (Levi, 1998; Braithwaite, 2003), individuals may 





decreasing tax morale. Although there is still limited evidence of a causal link between tax 
compliance attitudes and actual tax compliant behavior (Halla, 2011), an increasing list of 
empirical findings show plausibly that tax morale may influence taxpayer behavior (Torgler, 
2002b; Alm and Torgler, 2006, Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Cummings et al., 2009; Koumpias 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2019).5  
In this paper we seek two main goals: to bring more clarity on what form of trust in 
government positively affects tax morale, and how the interaction of trust in government and the 
manner in which government power is actually exercised  may jointly influence tax morale (Alm 
and Torgler, 2006, Chan et al., 2017; Cyan et al., 2016; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; 
Slemrod, 2003; Torgler 2003b, 2005a, 2005b). Empirically we employ individual survey 
information from the World Values Survey (WVS) covering 92 countries in six waves that 
intermittently span a total of 30 years from 1981 to 2014 with a lapse of coverage from 1985 till 
1988. We test four hypotheses: (H1) whether trust in government positively affects tax morale: 
(H2) which types of government organizations specifically are most salient in increasing tax 
morale; (H3) what is the direct impact of positive and negative democratic transitions 
(respectively, enhancing and undermined political rights and civil liberties) on tax morale; and (iv) 
how does democratic transition condition the impact of trust on different types government 
organizations.    
The main contribution of this work is the extension of our understanding on how trust in 
different types of government organizations influences tax morale and how those effects may be 
conditioned in situations of democratic transition.  
 
5 Recent clinical evidence based on a physiological marker also points towards a potential link between social norms 
and tax compliance. Dulleck et al. (2016) proxy psychic costs through a measure of heart rate variability and find a 




 Empirically, we find that trust in government organizations increase the probability of 
reporting high tax morale across the board with effect sizes ranging from 2.31 per cent to 3.16 per 
cent across different government organizations. Our second main finding is that tax morale is most 
affected by the level of trust in government organizations that implement and deliver public goods 
and services to the citizenry; i.e., trust in output government organizations has a stronger and more 
robust positive association with tax morale than trust in input government organizations. Third, 
we find that negative democratic transitions have a more positive impact on tax morale than 
positive transitions. In addition, the interactive effects of trust in different government 
organizations and democratic transitions unveil substantial heterogeneity in the tax morale 
response.  
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The second section reviews the literature 
exploring the impact of trust in government on tax morale. In the third section we develop a 
conceptual framework of how governments may elicit trust and ultimately affect individuals’ 
willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws. The fourth section describes the data and 
empirical approach we employ. The fifth section presents and interprets our results, and the sixth 
section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Tax morale is shortly defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2006). A 
more inclusive definition is offered by Luttmer and Singhal (2014) who highlight five mechanisms 
through which tax morale could influence individual tax compliance: intrinsic motivations, 
reciprocity, peer effects and social influences, culture, and information.6 A consistent finding in 
 
6 This may not be an exhaustive list, of course. For example, Filippin et al. (2013) using survey data from Italy, also 





the previous literature is that trust in government positively affects individuals’ willingness to 
comply with the tax laws. In particular, higher trust in the country’s legal system, the government, 
and the parliament, have all been found to increase individual tax morale (Torgler, 2003a, 2003b, 
2005; Cummings et al., 2009; Cyan et al., 2016, 2017; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler and 
Schneider, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) Other 
factors such as upholding religious beliefs, support for democracy, and pride in one’s national 
origin also have been found to influence tax morale in a positive way (Torgler, 2005b, 2006). In 
this regard, Orviska and Hudson (2003), using information from the British Social Attitudes 
Survey, find that law abidance and civic duty work to actually lower tax evasion (as one would 
expect from higher tax morale). 
Although these reported empirical findings strongly indicate that trusting government is 
associated with higher willingness to comply with the tax laws, it is much less well-known what 
is that government does to trigger taxpayers’ trust. Two main explanations on how governments 
affect trust may be found in the literature. First, it has been theorized that governments may elicit 
trust when they deliver what taxpayers demand. For instance, widespread support for the programs 
provided by government legitimates government actions and may impose a social norm towards 
paying taxes (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Voters supporting the winning party would 
expect it to implement the policies they favor (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), which means that 
government policies earn trust from those who support them and disappoint and lose trust from 
those voters who oppose them (Citrin, 1974).  At the same time, this suggest that individuals would 
distrust those officials who implement policies they do not favor and, consequently, would not be 
willing to comply with their tax obligations. Thus, overall, the link between meeting individual 




A second explanation that has been suggested is that governments that are perceived as 
being fair may elicit individual trust (Alm and Torgler, 2006).  In this respect, experimental 
evidence suggests that individuals are more compliant when they have a voice in how their taxes 
are spent and vice-versa (Alm et al., 1993; Wahl et al., 2010; Casal et al., 2016; Drogalas et al., 
2018) and have a say in how tax enforcement should be done (Alm, 1999). Consistent with the 
idea that democracy gives individuals an opportunity to get the public goods they desire 
(Rohrschneider, 2005), taxpayers tend to be more compliant when they are given an outlet to 
express their opinion about what policies should be adopted. For example, survey evidence from 
Switzerland showed a positive relationship between direct democracy and taxpayer satisfaction 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Those findings complement earlier results that in cantons where direct 
democratic rights were more developed, the average size of tax evasion was smaller (Pommerehne 
and Weck-Hannemann, 1996, Torgler 2005a).7 
3. Conceptual Framework  
First, in order to understand which government actions elicit trust, and where in 
government those actions are carried out, we separate government organizations into input and 
output organizations (Rothstein, 2005). The input side of government is its political side; it 
converts individual preferences into policies that will help produce, among other things, the goods 
and services that individuals want government to provide. The output side fulfills an administrative 
role of delivering the goods and services decided upon on the input side. Table B.1 in the Appendix 
lists input, and output organizations of the government, which respectively include the government 
or Parliament, and civil services, the courts, or the police.  
 
7 More generally, the presence of referendum institutions could be another potential mechanism through which trust 




Second, to assess how the interaction between trust and power affect tax we use democratic 
transitions to proxy for substantial variation of trust and power of different government 
organizations. One might expect differential effects of increased trust in input and output 
organizations on tax morale in response to positive and negative democratic transitions. These 
transitions are the result of significant shifts, either an attack on or a victory, in political rights and 
civil liberties that are sufficiently large to cause a change of status in the country’s designation as 
Free, Partially-free or Not Free in the Freedom House survey. Arguably, a positive democratic 
transition which involves changes in input organizations of the government that may empower 
individual citizens is more likely to spur higher tax morale between individuals with trust in input 
as opposed to output organizations. Lab experiments suggest that allowing for voice on tax 
contributions and distributions leads to higher tax morale (Casal et al., 2016). On the contrary, a 
negative democratic transition that may be linked to a shift closer to ruling with an “iron fist” may 
increase perceptions of the power of government organizations and, particularly, of output side 
ones, which include tax authorities.  
3.1. Input and Output Government Organizations 
The input side of government is constituted by the political organizations of government – 
the legislative and executive branches. Their members are elected to advance the policies favored 
by the electorate who supported them. Therefore, the policies they advance may certainly favor 
certain groups over others (Rothstein 2005).  
The partisan character of input organizations makes it more challenging for them to elicit 
widespread trust among taxpayers. For example, in Sweden people place higher trust in 




and the police) than in the representative organizations of democracy such as political parties or 
parliaments (Rothstein, 2005).  
Another obstacle with the input side of government as generator of trust stems from the 
fact that voting does not necessarily ensure fair results. Madison (1788) observed this shortcoming 
of democracy and underlined that individual freedoms are threatened not only by government 
actions, but also by the decisions of majorities that might undermine minorities' freedoms. Levi 
(1998) pointed out that the introduction of safeguards to protect minorities may reduce the danger 
of a "dictatorship of the majority" at the expense of the majority’s resentment.  
Consequently, for all the reasons above, it seems unlikely that input government 
organizations would elicit from their actions a very high level of taxpayers' trust and tax morale. 
Output organizations are in charge of delivering public goods and services to individuals 
which are previously decided upon by the input institutions of government. Therefore, output 
organizations are not concerned with what should be delivered, but instead with how those goods 
and services are actually delivered. Building a relationship of trust between taxpayers and the tax 
administration (an organization of the output side of government) has been seen as critical to 
increase voluntary tax compliance (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). 
Taxpayers are no longer seen as subordinates of the state, but instead more as partners of the tax 
administration, that are more likely to willfully comply (Rothstein, 2005). When treating taxpayers 
more as partners, tax authorities deliver good governance that is supportive of democratic 
principles (Braithwaite, 2003).  
3.2. Trust in and Power of Government Organizations and Tax Morale  
The recent literature on trust in tax authorities and tax compliance highlights two elements. 




eliciting voluntary tax compliance, and the second concerns how taxpayers are treated by 
authorities. Direct contact between individuals is at the cornerstone of building a trust relationship 
because it provides the parties with superior clues regarding the other side’s trustworthiness 
(Ostrom, 1998). Taxpayers are likely to trust (or distrust) tax authorities depending on their 
experiences dealing with them in direct interactions (Gangl et al., 2013). However, tax 
administrations are not the only government institution taxpayers deal with. Since other institutions 
of the output side of government also deliver governance consistent with democratic principles, 
they may jointly influence individual willingness to comply with tax laws.  
There is a broad consensus on how issues of fairness and legitimacy affect trust in 
authorities in a variety of arenas impacting: (i) voluntary compliance with their norms and requests 
(Levi, 1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein, 2005, 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008); (ii) tax 
compliance (Frey and Feld, 2002; Murphy, 2004; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Feld and 
Frey, 2007; (iii) law enforcement (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); and (iv) cooperation with authorities 
(De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). 
 Economists have started to explore whether procedural justice is a source of satisfaction 
for individuals in the same way that consumption of goods and services increases individual 
utility (Frey et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Obtaining satisfaction from receiving fair 
treatment may be the reason behind the experimental finding that allowing taxpayers to vote 
leads to increased tax compliance (Alm et al., 1993, 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Wahl et al., 
2010).  
In understanding where trust is created, we must note that individuals most likely do not 
treat government institutions as a single monolithic entity. Rothstein and Stolle’s (2008) factor 




that two dimensions of institutional trust emerge. Institutions belonging to the input side of 
government such as parliaments, political parties, and government fall within the same dimension, 
whereas institutions from the output side such as the police, the army, and legal institutions, load 
on a different dimension. An additional analysis using Sweden’s SOM survey produced similar 
results.  
The arguments above strongly suggest that the kind of trust in government that would affect 
tax morale is likely to come, at least more strongly, from the treatment received by individuals in 
the output side of government. Other than affecting individual well-being, interaction with output 
organizations also informs citizens on how government regards them (North, 1994).  
We therefore pose the following hypotheses that will be empirically tested in the following 
section:  
H1: Individuals who trust government would show higher tax morale than those who do 
not trust it 
H2: Individuals who trust the output organizations of government would show even 
stronger tax morale  
H3: A positive (negative) democratic transition would be associated with high (low) tax 
morale.  
H4: Individuals with trust in input organizations of government in countries experiencing 
a positive (negative) democratic transition would exhibit higher (lower) tax morale than those 
individuals who trust output organizations under the same democratic transitions conditions.  
4. Data and Empirical Approach 




We employ survey information from all six waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), 
which collects individuals’ opinions on a large array of topics, spanning two periods,  1981-85 and 
1988-2014, and  covering 92 countries, ranging from full-fledged democracies to one-party 
governments (Inglehart et al., 2014).8 Coverage is uneven; only five countries appear in all six 
WVS survey waves, while 30 countries appear in only one. As a result, our dataset should be 
understood as pooled cross-sectional observations at the individual level from an unbalanced panel 
of countries.  
Differences in political systems may influence how individuals come to trust authorities. 
Individuals appreciate the trust government places in them and in turn may become more willing 
to comply with taxes (Alm et al., 1993; Wahl et al., 2010). Thus, higher tax compliance may be 
associated with governance practices consistent with democratic principles (Braithwaite, 2003). 
For these reasons we need to control for the differences in political regimes from full-fledged 
democracies and other types of regimes. 
To control for the different ways that governments interact with their citizens, we use the 
Freedom in the World survey.9 The survey assesses a country’s level of political rights and civil 
liberties enjoyed by their inhabitants. Each dimension generates a score from 1 to 7, with lower 
values meaning higher degree of political and civil rights. The survey ranks annually most 
countries in the world, and groups them as free countries (with scores from 1 up to 2.5), partially-
free countries (with scores between 3 and 5.5, and between 3 and 5 beginning with the 2003 ratings 
onwards), and not-free countries (with scores 5.5 and above). In the empirical analysis, we use this 
 
8 The WVS team controls the accuracy of surveys by providing the main questionnaire (in English) to each country 
team which translates it into the local language(s). In turn, the local teams submit the local questionnaires to a 
different translator who translates it back to English. 





latter information in two different ways. First, these composite scores enter as continuous control 
variables in standard logit regression models. Second, they are used to generate indicators of 
democratic transition from free - in the parlance of the survey -, partially-free, or not free status—
see Table B.2 in the Appendix. That is, the positive democratic transition indicator is equal to one 
when a country’s status on the Freedom in the World survey improves (from Not Free to Partially-
free or Free, from Partially-free to Free) and zero, otherwise. Conversely, the negative democratic 
transition indicator is equal to one when a country’s status deteriorates (from Free to Partially-free 
or Not Free, from Partially-free to Not Free), and zero, otherwise. This allows us to exploit changes 
in underlying political institution arrangements as identifying variation of the role of trust in 
different government functions on tax morale. We believe this measure of political freedom sums 
in the most holistic – yet arguably coarse – way how government policies affect individual attitudes 
towards the government as a whole, including tax morale.   
4.2. Model Selection 
This subsection describes how we construct our dependent variable, tax morale, and our 
key independent variables of trust in government and democratic transition, and the additional 
control variables already well identified in the previous literature. 
The question in the WVS that we use to generate our tax morale binary outcome variable 
is: 
“Please tell me whether you think cheating on taxes if you have a chance can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between (1-10 scale: 1: never justifiable; 10: always 
justifiable).” 
We code tax morale into a binary variable that measures high tax morale taking the value 




2-10).10 This choice is motivated by the empirical distribution of the survey responses of the WVS’ 
tax morale variable and confirmed via a statistical test using a stereotype logit regression model 
(Liu, 2014). Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents the histogram of the 10-point WVS scale of 
responses to the survey question. The mass of survey responses (62.07%) is concentrated on the 
extreme “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” making it a natural candidate to model it separately. 
The remaining responses are fairly evenly distributed over the other nine possible values.  
Respondents seem to differentiate between “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” and all other 
responses.  The stereotype logistic regression model allows us to formally test whether respondents 
differentiate between the values of the 10-point scale based on the empirical distribution of the tax 
morale variable. In the majority of statistical tests, survey responses 2 through 9 are statistically 
indistinguishable.11 These findings make a strong case for coding individual WVS tax morale 
survey responses into a binary variable.  
Although the WVS is generally employed in the tax morale literature, it is not free of the 
general shortcomings associated with self-reported answers. A prominent shortcoming is that 
individuals’ answers to the question may not correlate with actual tax behavior; some individuals 
may want to make up for past behavior by asserting high tax morale in survey responses. Several 
papers (Cummings et al., 2009; Halla, 2012;  Koumpias and Martinez-Vazquez, 2019) have shown 
evidence of a causal link between tax morale and a some measure of tax compliance. Other issues 
contemplated in the literature, such as the problems derived from using a single question to 
 
10 Typically, tax morale is coded into an ordered variable in four different categories. See, for example, Torgler 
(2006) and Rodriguez-Justicia and Theilen (2018) but a binary approach has been preferred in other recent studies, 
too (Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2018). 
11 Each response value is represented by a scale parameter φ1i, i=1,…,10. The parameter representing the extreme 
responses “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” and “cheating on taxes is always justifiable” are denoted by φ_11 
(corner constraint set equal to 1) and φ_19 (base outcome set equal to zero). We find very precise evidence that 
respondents strongly distinguish between value 1 (corner constraint φ_11) and values 2 through 9 (φ_12,…,φ_19). In 
addition, in the majority of tests assessing whether each one of the intermediate parameters φ_12,…,φ_19 is equal to 




measure tax morale, are counter-balanced by the difficulties in assembling indexes because of the 
correlation among components and deciding on the relative importance (weights) of each 
component (Alm and Torgler, 2006). 
Next, we discuss the variables used to test the proposition that government organizations 
on the output side may be more salient in driving tax morale. The question in the WVS that asks 
individuals how much they trust different government organizations reads:  
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
much confidence or none at all? (4-scale item, coded 1=a great deal… 4=none at all)” 
We code trust in the different government organizations as indicator variables that take the 
value of 1 when survey respondents have either “a great deal of confidence” or “quite a lot of 
confidence” in the government organization at hand; zero, otherwise: 
Trust in the Government. This independent variable is capturing individual trust in the 
national government at the time of the survey. For brevity, we will, thereafter, refer to this input-
side government organization as “government.” It is also the government organization with which 
respondents are expected to be most familiar. We expect a positive sign between trust in the 
government and tax morale. 
Trust in the Civil Service. This variable measures individual trust in government 
bureaucracies, which are in charge of service delivery in health, education, social services, and so 
on. “Civil service” may not fully capture individual experience with the output side of 
government;12 measures of trust in specific organizations (e.g. school system or social welfare) 
 
12 Rothstein and Stolle (2008) contended that trust in Civil Service may be considered as trust in the political 





would be a better alternative, but they are not available.13 We expect a positive sign between trust 
in civil services and tax morale. 
Trust in Police. The role of this government organization is to protect individuals’ lives 
and property. Police actions fall right into the output side of government.  The expected sign of 
the coefficient is positive. 
Trust in the Courts. The relationship between the courts and the legal system, an output-
side government organization, in eliciting individual tax morale has been explored in previous 
studies and found to be empirically supported (Torgler 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a; Torgler and 
Murphy, 2005). One possible issue relates to the extent which individuals interact with the legal 
system and courts. The same positive association is expected between trust in courts and tax 
morale, albeit of potentially smaller magnitude due to less exposure of individuals to the courts as 
opposed to civil services. 
Trust in Parliament. Higher trust in legislatures has been found in the previous literature 
to increase tax morale (Torgler 2003a, 2004a; Torgler and Murphy, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Torgler, 2009). The interpretation of the variable is partially complicated by the fact that trust in 
parliament may gauge not only trust in the institution but also trust in the incumbents, and therefore 
survey responses may also express attitudes towards members of the parliament in the opposition 
(Citrin, 1974).  Trust in the parliament is expected to be positively correlated with tax morale but 
a less pronounced effect is possible because respondents may also be expressing their attitudes 
towards members of the parliament in the opposition. 
 
13 Even if we had measures of individual trust from several output organizations, it could be difficult to ascertain 
their relative relevance in shaping individual Tax Morale because of different country arrangements for different 
functions. For example, healthcare in the U.S. is provided mainly by private providers whereas in many Western 




We further exploit events of substantial changes in the political system that may provide 
identifying variation in individual attitudes towards trust in government organizations. We do so 
by creating an indicator of positive and negative democratic transition. Based on the Freedom 
House information, the indicator of positive democratic transition takes the value of one when 
countries become either free or partially-free from partially-free or not free; zero, otherwise. In an 
analogous fashion, we generated an indicator of negative democratic transition when the status of 
a country’s political system changes from free to partially-free or from partially-free to not free. 
Individual support for democracy has been found in the previous literature to positively 
affect tax morale (Torgler, 2003c, 2004b, 2005b; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). Moreover, the 
availability of direct democratic practices such as referenda has been shown to increase tax morale 
among Swiss taxpayers (Torgler, 2005a). However, Inglehart (2003) in examining the issue of 
how to measure support for democracy noted that measures of overt support may be misleading 
because a substantial proportion of democracy supporters also support non-democratic regime 
types, even among those living in well-established democracies. Consequently, following Linde 
(2012), we use a binary measure of democratic support gauging individuals’ rejection of non-
democratic regimes.   
Finally, we include in our analysis a number of other predictors of tax morale identified in 
the previous literature, including demographics such as age and gender, as well as information on 
socio-economic status, such as income, marital status, educational attainment, and employment 
status. We expect females, married and older respondents to exhibit higher tax morale than males, 
singles, or younger individuals (Torgler, 2004c; Torgler, 2007a; Hug and Spörri, 2011; Cyan et 
al., 2016).  The educational attainment variable is measured in 9 scales which we recode into 4 




elementary school, vocational school, secondary and higher education. The evidence on the 
relationship between educational attainment and tax morale is mixed with a number of studies 
reporting either a positive (Torgler, 2005a, 2005b; Konrad and Qari, 2012; Rodriguez-Justicia and 
Theilen, 2018) or a negative relationship (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Doerrenberg and 
Peichl, 2013). The 10-scale income measure in the WVS has been documented to suffer from 
measurement error and coverage problems such as inconsistencies across countries (Layard et al., 
2008). As a result, the same income scale corresponds to substantially different income intervals 
in different countries, which poses analytical challenges for cross-country analyses (Donnelly and 
Pop-Eleches, 2018).  
Despite these limitations, some researchers have simply used the original income variable 
in the WVS and interpreted it as income deciles (Ingehart et al., 2008). Donnelly and Pop-Eleches 
(2018) apply a series of corrections to a subset of WVS country surveys to construct and make 
publicly available a measure of income at purchasing power parity (or exchange rate) in 2005 US 
dollars.14 Other solutions offered in the literature include collapsing the 10-scale variable into 
quintiles (Solt, 2008); or creating three categories of income that approximates terciles (Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2011). We follow this latter approach and construct low, middle, and high-income 
indicators that correspond to scales 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10, respectively. Respondents in the lowest 
income tercile are more likely to report high tax morale relative to those in the middle tercile, while 
those in the top tercile may exhibit lower tax morale due to the heavier tax burden they bear 
(Torgler, 2002a).  
With regards to employment status, salaried individuals who are likely to be subject to tax 
withholding are also expected to have higher tax morale than those self-employed. Religiosity is 
 
14 However, the dataset spans 137 out of 241 countries from the first five waves of the WVS and, thus, does not 




suggestive of individual involvement with formal religion, gauged by attendance at religious 
services, has been found to be an important determinant of tax morale (Torgler, 2003a, 2005a, 
2006; Alm and Torgler, 2006, Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Torgler and Martinez-Vazquez, 2009). 
National pride has also been linked to tax morale in previous studies (Torgler, 2005b; Torgler and 
Schneider, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Konrad and Qari, 2012). Similarly, to our 
construction of support for democracy, we code the qualitative responses to national pride and 
religiosity as indicators that take the value of one when respondent have the most positive attitudes 
(“Religion is very important in life”, “very proud”).  
4.3. Logit Regression Models 
  In order to estimate the impact of trust in institutions on tax morale we specify and estimate 
several empirical models. First, we employ a logit regression model that allows us to test our first 
two hypotheses: H1: Trust in government is associated with higher tax morale; and H2: Trust in 
output-side organizations of the government is more strongly associated with tax morale than trust 
in input-side organizations of the government. 
The logit model we estimate is given by:  
𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
1,…,4
𝑙
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑋𝑖𝑡
8,…,13
𝑙
+ 𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗)𝜷𝟏𝟒 + 𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡)𝜷𝟏𝟓 + 𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where our dependent variable 𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is High Tax Morale, measuring individual i’s willingness to 
comply with tax laws in country 𝑗 at WVS wave 𝑡 based on whether she believes cheating on taxes 
is “never justifiable”. We include a vector of five variables, ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
1,…,4
𝑙  which collects 
all four key independent variables with information about respondents’ trust in different 
government functions in both the input and the output side.  




determinants of tax morale as discussed above: age, indicators of religiosity, national pride, being 
female, being single, low- and high-income terciles and employment status. It should be noted 
though that the support for democracy survey question was not asked to more than half of the total 
respondents in all six waves of the WVS. Thus, to avoid discarding more than half of the 
observations, we only include this variable in a supplemental specification.  
Finally,  we include dummy variables  to control for country 𝑗 and WVS-wave 𝑡 fixed 
effects in vectors 𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗) and 𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡) and cluster standard errors at the country level. 
4.4. Democratic Transition Treatment Effects Model 
Next, we present a supplemental empirical strategy to test hypotheses H3 and H4. Using a 
comparative case study framework, we exploit instances of democratic transition to estimate the 
relationship of trust in government organizations and tax morale after periods of heightened 
political transition processes.  






∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑘𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡
6,…,10
𝑘
∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑋𝑖𝑡
7,…,15
𝑙
+ 𝜹𝟏𝟔𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗) + 𝜹𝟏𝟕𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡)
+ 𝜉𝑖𝑡  (2) 
where our dependent variable 𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is High Tax Morale, measuring individual i’s willingness to 
comply with tax laws in country 𝑗 at WVS wave 𝑡 when perceiving cheating on taxes as “never 
justifiable”. 
One should be careful in their interpretation given that they involve interaction terms of 




democratic transition on tax morale in the absence of trust in government, respectively. Parameters 
𝛿𝑙 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6  capture the correlation between trust in a government function of the five we 
consider and tax morale in the absence of democratic transition. The incremental effects of a 
positive and a negative democratic transition and trust in government relative to trust in 
government in the absence of any transition are equal to 𝛿1 + 𝜌𝑘, 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝛾1 +
𝜌
𝑘
, 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively. Similarly, the incremental effects relative to a positive 
or a negative democratic transition with lack of trust in any government function are equal to 𝛿𝑙 +
𝜌
𝑘
, 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘, 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively. Finally, the effects 
of a positive and negative transition given trust in government to lack of trust in a period of no 
democratic transition is given by 𝛿1 + 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘, 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5  and 𝛾1 + 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘, 𝑙 =
2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively. 
As in the logit regression models, we control for the same determinants of tax morale 
collected in vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (1), as well as support for democracy, religiosity, and national 
pride. 
5. Results 
First, we present the results of the logit regression model (equation 1) in Table 1. Those 
with national pride have a much higher probability of reporting high tax morale, holding all other 
variables at their means. The impact of religiosity is also positive, but smaller. This latter echoes 
Dalton’s (1996) observation that religious affiliation is losing its relevance in providing 
individuals with guidance about civil-political issues. Females are more likely to report high tax 
morale compared to males and older individuals are more likely to report tax morale than 
younger ones. In the same fashion, retirees are also positively associated with higher tax morale. 




factor is not being employed or retired but rather the nature of employment; self-employed 
respondents show less tax morale relative to salaried workers. The same holds for part-time 
workers who share some common employment characteristics with the self-employed. In 
addition, those with no or very low educational attainment (up to elementary school) are 
significantly less likely to report high tax morale in all specifications but those in columns (4) 
and (6), which supports the similar findings by McGee and Ross (2012). The least wealthy 
respondents (those in the lowest income tercile) have higher tax morale relative to respondents in 
the second tercile. 
Table 1: Logit Regression Model Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Government Civil Services Parliament Courts Police All 
Trust in Government 0.123***     0.0525 
 (0.0288)     (0.0269) 
Trust in Civil 
Services 
 0.116***    0.0712** 
  (0.0231)    (0.0261) 
Trust in Parliament   0.100***   -0.0116 
   (0.0267)   (0.0248) 
Trust in Courts    0.117***  0.0361 
    (0.0234)  (0.0226) 
Trust in Police     0.138*** 0.0613 
     (0.0331) (0.0370) 
Political Rights 0.0470 0.00797 0.00523 -0.0916 0.0112 -0.0616 
 (0.110) (0.0905) (0.0915) (0.105) (0.0904) (0.132) 
Civil Liberties 0.0603 0.0748 0.0818 0.240 0.0775 0.256 
 (0.152) (0.121) (0.122) (0.146) (0.122) (0.188) 
National Pride 0.368*** 0.381*** 0.378*** 0.372*** 0.373*** 0.352*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0430) (0.0417) (0.0446) (0.0421) (0.0500) 
Religiosity 0.231*** 0.237*** 0.232*** 0.241*** 0.232*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0325) (0.0302) (0.0331) 
Age 0.0121*** 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.0122*** 0.0125*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.000864) (0.000893) (0.000907) (0.00101) (0.000898) (0.000977) 
Female 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.151*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0228) (0.0212) (0.0262) 
Elementary Ed -0.0770* -0.100* -0.0873* -0.0528 -0.0827* -0.0650 
 (0.0349) (0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0390) (0.0387) (0.0355) 
Vocational Ed -0.0402 -0.0502 -0.0436 -0.0437 -0.0477 -0.0402 
 (0.0260) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0330) (0.0285) (0.0301) 
Higher Ed 0.0363 0.0327 0.0352 0.0401 0.0303 0.0525 
 (0.0369) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0405) (0.0355) (0.0431) 
Part-time -0.0595* -0.0680* -0.0660* -0.0591* -0.0681* -0.0470 
 (0.0288) (0.0290) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0308) 
Self-employed -0.0623* -0.0686* -0.0722** -0.0757** -0.0738** -0.0602* 
 (0.0276) (0.0282) (0.0270) (0.0285) (0.0263) (0.0289) 
Retired 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 0.124*** 0.100*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0301) (0.0275) (0.0314) 




 (0.0285) (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0333) (0.0298) (0.0317) 
Student 0.0257 0.0214 0.0239 0.0158 0.0177 0.0355 
 (0.0281) (0.0257) (0.0250) (0.0278) (0.0251) (0.0301) 
Unemployed -0.0174 -0.0328 -0.0301 -0.0468 -0.0331 -0.0217 
 (0.0385) (0.0382) (0.0398) (0.0475) (0.0385) (0.0493) 
Part-time -0.0344 -0.0564 -0.0533 -0.0732 -0.0515 -0.0360 
 (0.0870) (0.0802) (0.0794) (0.0874) (0.0865) (0.0942) 
Single -0.0772*** -0.0826*** -0.0751*** -0.0757*** -0.0726*** -0.0799*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0164) (0.0178) 
Low Income 0.104*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.113*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0303) (0.0279) (0.0341) 
High Income -0.0726 -0.0723 -0.0704 -0.0642 -0.0673 -0.0688 
 (0.0446) (0.0457) (0.0460) (0.0522) (0.0456) (0.0531) 
Constant -0.335 -0.309* -0.281 -0.229 -0.335* -0.338 
 (0.282) (0.145) (0.147) (0.160) (0.153) (0.291) 
Observations 232,012 242,049 242,112 204,016 248,970 176,915 
Notes: Education, employment and income values in reference to secondary education, full-time employment and medium income. Standard 
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p< .001 
 
Possible explanations include the fact that low-income individuals often pay very few taxes 
yet understand the importance of taxation to fund public services or social assistance they may rely 
on; alternatively, low-income individuals are averse to risk relative to medium- or high-income 
respondents. We cannot distinguish any statistically significant differences in tax morale between 
medium- and high-income respondents, confirming prior findings in the literature (Torgler, 
2007).15   
Logit coefficients report the change in the z-score of the dependent variable of a one-unit 
change in the independent variable, holding other explanatory variables at pre-determined values. 
To make those estimates easier to interpret, Table 2 reports the marginal effects measuring the 
change in the probability of reporting tax morale of a unit change in trust in the different 
government organizations, holding all other explanatory variables constant at their means. The 
estimated coefficients should be interpreted as the partial derivative of the independent variables 
of interest; namely, the independent variables measuring respondents’ trust in different 
government organization. 
 
15 Including support for democracy as a regressor, we recover a large, positive and statistically significant 




Table 2: Conditional Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Government Civil Services Parliament Courts Police All 
Trust in 
Government 
0.0283***     0.0125 
 (0.00662)     (0.00641) 
Trust in Civil 
Services 
 0.0267***    0.0169** 
  (0.00533)    (0.00621) 
Trust in Parliament   0.0231***   -0.00276 
   (0.00614)   (0.00589) 
Trust in Courts    0.0278***  0.00858 
    (0.00553)  (0.00537) 
Trust in Police     0.0316*** 0.0146 
     (0.00760) (0.00879) 
Observations 232,012 242,049 242,112 204,016 248,970 176,915 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p< .001 
The first five columns present coefficient estimates for trust in each of the four different 
government organizations we consider plus general trust in government. They are all positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, in the interpretation of our results we focus on the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients to investigate any differential impact among them. For our first independent 
variable of interest, a one unit increase in Trust in Government (the indicator variable’s value 
turning from zero to one) increases the probability of reporting high tax morale by about 2.83 per 
cent. Columns (2) and (3) report lower coefficients for the impact Trust in Civil Services and the 
Parliament, at 2.67 and 2.31 per cent, respectively. Possible reasons for those results in the first 
case may be the lack of specificity for the type of Civil Service case (it may have different 
meanings for different people). In the case of the Parliament, as discussed above, there are reasons 
to expect that Trust in this institution may not be as strongly related to tax morale because 




find strong associations between trust in courts and police at 2.78 and 3.16 per cent, respectively.16 
In column (6), we report the marginal effects of trust in every government organization we consider 
based on a joint specification. This allows us to discern the relative importance that trust in 
different government organizations has on reporting high tax morale. Only trust in civil services 
increase the probability of reporting high tax morale by 1.69 per cent. The estimated coefficients 
of trust in all other government organizations are not statistically different from zero at the 5 per 
cent level of statistical significance. Summarizing, we find that, indeed, respondents who generally 
have higher trust in government organizations are linked to higher tax morale and that trust in 
output-side government organizations, indeed, is a stronger predictor of tax morale than trust in 
input-side organizations.  
Table 3 shows the conditional marginal effects of the indicators of positive and negative 
democratic transition, trust in government organizations, as well as their interaction terms. The 
coefficient estimates of the full regression specified in equation (2) are omitted from the 
presentation to focus our attention to the marginal effects of the key independent variables. 
Table 3: Conditional Marginal Effects of Democratic Transition Treatment-Effects 
Model 





Parliament Courts Police All 
Positive DT 0.0351 0.0264 0.0257 0.00482 0.0371 0.102 
 (0.0405) (0.0289) (0.0286) (0.0728) (0.0316) (0.0807) 
Trust in Government 0.0307***     0.00908 
 (0.00610)     (0.00625) 
Trust in Government*Pos DT -0.0259     0.0718 
 (0.0218)     (0.0395) 
Trust in Civil Services  0.0277***    0.0143* 
  (0.00470)    (0.00580) 
Trust in Civil Services*Pos DT  -0.0117    0.0387 
  (0.0321)    (0.0465) 
Trust in Parliament   0.0272***   0.00251 
   (0.00560)   (0.00603) 
 
16 Several other considerations may be behind the strong results for trust in police. For example, results from 
behavioral experiments indicate that direct, face-to-face communication is superior to other forms of interaction in 




Trust in Parliament*Pos DT   -0.0221   -0.0378 
   (0.0299)   (0.0246) 
Trust in Courts    0.0306***  0.0119* 
    (0.00511)  (0.00564) 
Trust in Courts*Pos DT    0.00815  -0.0554*** 
    (0.00885)  (0.0136) 
Trust in Police     0.0372*** 0.0164 
     (0.00731) (0.00955) 
Trust in Police*Pos DT     -0.0525** 0.00286 
     (0.0172) (0.0302) 
Negative DT 0.0869* 0.0821 0.0934* 0.129** 0.0993* 0.143** 
 (0.0415) (0.0455) (0.0387) (0.0463) (0.0389) (0.0524) 
Trust in Government*Neg DT -0.00813     0.0324* 
 (0.0247)     (0.0157) 
Trust in Civil Services*Neg 
DT 
 0.00355    0.0222 
  (0.0249)    (0.0201) 
Trust in Parliament*Neg DT   -0.0286   -0.0377** 
   (0.0154)   (0.0118) 
Trust in Courts*Neg DT    -0.0238  -0.0266* 
    (0.0172)  (0.0133) 
Trust in Police*Neg DT     -0.0414* -0.0231 
     (0.0200) (0.0161) 
Observations 232,012 242,049 242,112 204,016 248,970 176,915 
Notes: “Pos DT” and “Neg DT” denote positive and negative democratic transitions, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parentheses. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p< .001 
 
The reported coefficients of the trust in government organizations are quantitatively and 
qualitatively very similar to those in Table 2.  We find a large, positive and statistically significant 
correlation between tax morale and trust in all five government organizations for the regression 
models in which they enter singularly, in columns (1) through (5). In fact, the effect size is larger 
than for the estimates in Table 2. The novel results in Table 3 include the effects of a positive and 
a negative democratic transition on tax morale and the interactive effects of trust in different 
government organizations on tax morale in periods of democratic transition. The event of a positive 
democratic transition has a null effect on the probability of reporting high tax morale across all 
specifications in Table 3.17 However, a negative transition does have a positive and statistically 
 
17 Torgler (2003c, 2007b) finds survey respondents from a Central or Eastern European country to report an 
increased tax morale relative to respondents from former Soviet countries, perhaps reflecting that the former 
countries had been more successful in “controlling the decay of tax morale during the transformation process”. Note 




significant impact. In fact, the magnitude of the estimated effects is large enough to dominate the 
incremental effect of the interaction terms that has the opposite sign.   
The estimated interaction terms reveal an interesting relationship between tax morale and 
trust in different government organizations in the wake of a positive democratic transition. The 
joint interpretation of the coefficient estimates in column (6) indicate that respondents with trust 
in the police or the courts during a period of either democratic transition are associated with 
lower tax morale than either those who lack trust during the transition or those who trust these 
organizations in periods of political stability. If trust in the police or the courts is an indication of 
respondents’ preference for a strong rule of law, the negative effect on tax morale may be 
interpreted as a statement of protest to the likely social instability associated with periods of 
democratic transition. 
6. Conclusions 
In recent years, scholars have shifted their focus to ask what makes people willing to 
comply with taxes beyond the incentives provided by audit probabilities and potential fines which 
were emphasized in the classical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. Considerable research has 
now been conducted verifying the important role of tax morale in tax compliance behavior 
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). This in turn has led to asking the question of what shapes tax morale. 
In this paper we have argued that trust in government and therefore the willingness to comply with 
tax laws is affected by the way citizens are treated when interacting with government institutions 
in the regular delivery of public goods and services. The evidence available from other fields 
strongly supports the argument that trust plays a fundamental role in fostering cooperation, and 
 
democratic market economies, just different tax morale reduction rates. In addition, in Torgler (2003c, 2007b) all 




thus provides independent support for the hypothesized mechanism for building tax morale.  We 
empirically test the propositions that individuals who trust government are more likely to exhibit 
higher tax morale and that trust in the output organizations of government in particular is even 
more likely to increase tax morale. For the empirical analysis we use data from 92 countries 
covering the 1981-2014 period in six successive waves of the WVS. Our results suggest that tax 
morale is influenced by individual trust in government organizations; and, particularly so, by trust 
in output-side government organizations, the entities with which individuals are more likely to 
interact. 
From a tax policy standpoint, the results in this paper are consistent with the 
recommendation in the tax compliance literature that building a relationship of trust and 
cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities is necessary to elicit voluntary tax compliance 
(e.g. Braithwaite, 2003; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Furthermore, the results in this paper 
suggest the need to expand that recommendation to all the output organizations of government 
(and not only where taxpayers meet tax authorities). Finally, the positive influence of a negative 
democratic transition on tax morale highlights the importance of the “enforced compliance” 
channel of the slippery slope framework. Assuming that a negative democratic transition goes in 
tandem with a “cops and robbers” attitude towards taxpayers, our findings suggest that even this 
approach may still yield increased tax morale despite its limitations in comparison to the “service 
and clients” approach (Kirchler et al., 2008).  
More generally, tax administration reform should be just one part of a broader reform in 
the public sector to instill trust in government. If individuals are at the mercy of government agents 
that demand bribes in exchange for goods and services individuals are entitled to get, impose 




be expected to voluntarily comply with taxes. Building a professional and responsive bureaucracy 
may be a good step in building trust in government and in fellow citizens (Rothstein, 2000; 
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Appendix A. Figures 
Figure A.1: WVS 10-point Tax Morale Response Histogram




Appendix B. Tables 
Table B.1: Input-side and Output-side Organizations of the Government 
Input-Side Output-Side 
National Government Civil Services (e.g. tax administration) 
Acting Parliament Justice and Courts 
 Police 
Table B.2: Freedom House Country Ratings 
Free Countries 
Andorra France Netherlands South Korea (1989-2014) 
Argentina Germany New Zealand Spain 
Australia Ghana Norway Sweden 
Brazil Hungary Peru (1999-2004, 2010-14) Switzerland 
Bulgaria India (1999-2014) Philippines (1999-2004) Taiwan 
Canada Indonesia (2005-09) Poland Trinidad and Tobago 
Chile Italy Romania UK 
Cyprus Japan Serbia Ukraine (2005-09) 
Czech Republic Latvia Serbia & Montenegro United States 
East Germany Lithuania Slovakia Uruguay 
Estonia Mali Slovenia Venezuela (1994-98) 
Finland Mexico (1999-2009) South Africa (1994-2014) West Germany 
Partially Free Countries 
Albania El Salvador Mexico (1981-1998, 2010-
2014) 
Tanzania 
Argentina (1981-84) Ethiopia Moldova Thailand 
Armenia Georgia Morocco Tunisia 
Bangladesh Guatemala Nigeria (1989-98, 2010-14) Turkey 
Belarus (1989-93) India (1989-98) North Macedonia Uganda 
Bosnia Indonesia (1999-2004) Pakistan (2010-14) Ukraine (1994-98, 2010-
14) 
Burkina Faso Jordan (1999-2009) Philippines (2010-14) Venezuela (1999-2004) 
Colombia Kuwait Russia (1989-98)  
Croatia Kyrgyzstan (2010-14) Singapore  
Dominican Republic Lebanon South Africa (1981-93)  
Ecuador Malaysia South Korea (1981-84)  
Not Free Countries 
Algeria Iran Libya Uzbekistan 
Azerbaijan Iraq Nigeria (1994-98) Vietnam 
Belarus (1994-1998, 
2010-14) 
Jordan (2010-14) Pakistan (1999-2004) Yemen 
China Kazakhstan Russia (2005-14) Zimbabwe 
Egypt Kyrgyzstan (1999-
2004) 
Rwanda  
 
